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Union Refusal to Arbitrate:
Pyett's Unanswered Question
Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett has dramatically altered the collective bargaining
landscape in the United States.2 After thirty years of applying Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver's3 holding to invalidate a union-negotiated agreement to arbitrate
federal statutory claims, the U.S. Supreme Court changed course. In Pyett, the
Court held that as long as agreement between a union and an employer to arbitrate
federal statutory claims is "clear[] and unmistakabl[e]," an employee can be re-
quired to arbitrate his or her federal statutory claims under a collective bargaining
agreement.4 The Pyett Court declined to address how courts should handle an
employee's federal statutory claim when the employee's union has refused to
arbitrate his grievance. Commentators and courts have proposed three distinct
theories as to how this situation should be handled.
The Pyett Court suggested that the duty of fair representation adequately pro-
tects an employee's interests when a union decides not to arbitrate his claim.6
This approach is an insufficient safeguard to an employee's meritorious claim
because it imposes on an employee the extra substantive burden of proving a
breach of the duty of fair representation in order to have his or her case heard.
Furthermore, a union may decline to arbitrate a meritorious claim without breach-
ing its duty of fair representation.
It has also been suggested that giving an individual employee the right to de-
mand arbitration would adequately protect his interest against the union's inde-
pendent interest. However, this theory is unworkable in practice because there is
no way to balance the costs of arbitration and the discretionary interests of the
union in a way that would justify allowing a union and an arbitrator to agree to
arbitrate an individual employee's federal statutory claims.
Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc., provides the most workable solution to
date, balancing competing union, employer, and employee interests. Kravar
gives an employee access to federal court, as a matter of right, in the face of union
refusal to arbitrate his or her federal statutory claims.8 Although the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York offered little discussion of the
policy behind its new rule, there are sound policy rationales underlying it.9
1. No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,2009) (mem) (5-4 decision).
2. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).
3. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
4. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1463, 1474 (alteration to original).
5. Id
6. Id. at 1473.
7. Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595.
8. Id. at *3.
9. See id.
1
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Triangle Services (Triangle) employed Eva Kravar as a daytime cleaner.' 0
Kravar was a sixty-two year-old Slovakian woman who had worked for Triangle
for over twenty-five years at the headquarters of Bloomberg L.P., a client of Tri-
angle." Triangle was a union contractor, subject to a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with Kravar's union.' 2 In August of 2003, Kravar was diag-
nosed with colon cancer.' 3 She underwent extensive abdominal surgery, including
a right hemicolectomy in which the right portion of her colon was removed.14
After the surgery, she was hospitalized for over a week and was unable to return
to work for two more months.'
In February of 2005, Triangle told Kravar that because it was moving its
headquarters to a new location, she would no longer have a job at the current loca-
tion.' 6 She was also told that all of the cleaning employees that currently worked
at what was to be Bloomberg's new location would become new hires and could
be paid less than the more senior employees at Bloomberg's current location.'7
Bloomberg moved its headquarters to a new location.'8 Seven employees, includ-
ing Kravar, were transferred from Kravar's workplace to the new Bloomberg loca-
tion.'9
On March 25, 2005, Triangle offered Kravar a nighttime cleaning position at
her former rate of pay.20 Approximately ninety-five percent of Triangle's clean-
ing jobs were nighttime positions, and nighttime positions were "more physically
demanding than daytime work."2' When Triangle offered Kravar the nighttime
position, it warned that if she did not take the position, she would be terminated. 22
Kravar responded to Triangle's offer with a note from her surgeon, stating that she
had "weakness of her anterior abdominal wall and that heavy work or heavy lift-
ing would be injurious to her health."23 On both the 2nd & 3rd of May 2005
"Kravar attempted to work night shifts at other buildings serviced by Triangle." 24
Kravar was able to perform light work, but "could not vacuum or perform heavy
lifting."25 Kravar was then assigned to work "standby for regular, daytime work-
ers who were sick or on vacation." 26 Triangle's day operations manager promised
Kravar that he would look for a daytime position for her, but he did not take any
10. Kravar v. Triangle Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RtH-FM, 2009 WL 805807, at *I (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2009) (mem).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id at *2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Kravar, 2009 WL 805807, at *2.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *1.
19. Id. at *2.
20. Id.
21. Id.




26. Id. at *3.
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steps to find her a position.27 Triangle finally terminated Kravar's employment on
August 31, 2005.28
The CBA between Triangle and Kravar's union contained a nondiscrimina-
tion clause that broadly prohibited discrimination and required union members to
submit all claims of discrimination to binding arbitration under the agreement's
grievance and dispute resolution procedure. 29 The CBA set out a two-step griev-
ance procedure for perceived violations of the anti-discrimination provision: "The
grievance may first be taken up between the representative of management and a
representative of the Union. If it is not settled, then it may be filed for arbitra-
tion."3 0 The CBA also had a provision stating that "[a]ll Union claims are brought
by the union alone and no individual shall have the right to compromise or settle
any claim without the written permission of the Union."3
Kravar gave a sworn statement in which she told her union representative that
she wished to arbitrate her disability claims.32 She also stated that, in response,
the union representative laughed and told her that she could not do so because the
union would most likely dismiss her complaint.3 3 The union representative testi-
fied in deposition that he did not recall speaking with Kravar or Triangle about
Kravar's medical condition. He also testified that Kravar's grievance was dis-
missed prior to arbitration because Triangle offered Kravar a permanent night
position.34 Triangle contended that Kravar never claimed through grievance that
her rights had been violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).3 5
The only evidence that Triangle offered to support this contention was a grievance
form filled out by the union representative that did not describe any of the claims
that Kravar demanded to arbitrate.3 6
After her termination, Kravar filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Triangle.37 Three weeks
later she was removed from the payroll.38 The EEOC issued a determination find-
ing reasonable cause to believe that Triangle failed to provide Kravar with an
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595, at *1. The nondiscrimination clause stated in relevant part:
There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of
race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other
characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City
Human Rights Code ... or any other similar laws, rules, or regulations. All such claims
shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Articles VII and VIII) as the
sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in ren-
dering decisions based upon claims of discrimination.
Id.
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595, at *3
36. Id.
37. Kravar v. Triangle Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH-FM, 2009 WL 805807, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
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adequate accommodation for her disability.39 Based on these findings, the EEOC
issued Kravar a "right to sue" letter, and Kravar filed suit against Triangle in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.40 Triangle moved to
compel arbitration of Kravar's claims under the CBA and the court denied the
motion.41 The court was not in a position to analyze Kravar's claims in the con-
text of Pyett because the denial occurred almost two years before Pyett4 2 was
decided.43 Triangle then moved for summary judgment and the court granted in
part and denied as to Kravar's ADA claim on March 17, 2009." Pyett was de-
cided on April 1, 2009 and the Kravar court stayed the case to request a supple-
mental briefing on the effect of Pyett.45 The Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that because the CBA operated to preclude Kravar
from raising her disability claims in any form, the CBA operated as a waiver of
Kravar's substantive ADA rights, and as such, could not be enforced.46
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Required arbitration of federal statutory rights has been a controversial sub-
ject in labor and employment law for over thirty years. To understand the impor-
tance of the holding in Krava, it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court's devel-
opment of rules pertaining to agreements to arbitrate statutory rights. The first of
these cases was decided in 1974. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Su-
preme Court took the position that arbitral procedures were adequate to resolve
contractual disputes, but that such procedures were "comparatively inappropriate
for the final resolution of rights created by Title VH."A7 This reasoning was based
on the perception of an arbitrator's role as one which effectuates the "intent of the
parties," but not the "requirements of enacted legislation."" According to the
Gardner-Denver Court, the "resolution of statutory or constitutional issues [is] a
primary responsibility of the courts," and the arbitrator's realm was "the law of
the shop, not the law of the land."4 9 The Supreme Court's primary concern in
Gardner-Denver is expressed in a rather succinct sentence: "It is uncertain
whether any minimal savings in udicial time and expense would justify the risk to
vindication of Title VII rights."
39. Id. at *3, *10. The EEOC also determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Triangle
had discriminated against Kravar based on national origin and that Triangle had retaliated against
Kravar by eliminating her benefits after she filed the EEOC charge. Id. The national origin claim and
the retaliation claim were dismissed by summary judgment. Id at *10.
40. Kravar, 2009 WL 805807, at *3.
41. See Kravar v. Triangle Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 5013956 (S.D.N.Y. May
11, 2007) (trial motion to compel arbitration).
42. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
43. See Kravar, 2009 WL 5013956 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2007) (trial motion to compel arbitration).




47. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
48. Id. at 56-57
49. Id. at 57.
50. Id. at 59.
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Underlying the Court's decision was the conflict of interest between a collec-
tive bargaining unit and an individual employee. The Court distinguished CBA
disputes from Title VII claims in that CBAs concern a "majoritarian process,"
while Title VII deals with an "individual's right to equal employment opportuni-
ties."" The court believed that this difference, coupled with a "union's exclusive
control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented,"
could lead the interests of an individual employee to be "subordinated to the col-
lective interests of the bargaining unit."52 The Gardner-Denver Court's solution
to this concern was to allow the employee to pursue his remedy under the griev-
ance arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and his separate cause
of action under Title VII.Y Gardner-Denver has received negative treatment in
the subsequent cases discussed in this note, but it has never been directly over-
ruled. Though it has been distinguished thoroughly, it can be said with relative
certainty that the proposition that an employee may never waive his substantive
Title VII rights is still as good today as on the day it was decided.54 The rest of
the opinion, however, has been thoroughly distinguished, and it appears that after
Pyett,55 Gardner-Denver may no longer be good law. The first of these important
distinguishing cases is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.56
Gilmer involved an arbitration clause in a securities registration application
purporting to cover "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and
any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination
of employment of such registered representative." The Supreme Court ad-
dressed many of what it characterized as misconceptions in the Gardner-Denver
opinion, stating:
[M]istrust of the arbitral process, however has been undermined
by our recent arbitration decisions ... We are well past the time
when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of
the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
58
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.
[S]tatutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agree-
ment, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.
The Court reasoned that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, an indi-
vidual does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute."a Instead, it
submits that statutory claim not to a judicial forum, but rather to an arbitral fo-
rum. 61 The Court found that parties who have made an agreement to arbitrate
51. Id. at 51.
52. Id.
53. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
54. Id.
55. 129 S. Ct. at 1456 (2009).
56. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 34 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)
59. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
61. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
No. 2] 519
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statutory claims should be held to that agreement unless Congress intended that no
such waiver be allowed. 62 The Court further reasoned that Congress, when enact-
ing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), did not intend to pro-
vide any protections against a waiver of judicial forum.63 Gilmer also made it
clear that "an individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement cov-
ering such an ADEA claim, though unable to sustain a private judicial action, will
still be free to file a charge with the EEOC."64 The Court found that arbitration
offers an adequate framework for protection of statutory rights under the ADEA.s
"So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function."66 The Court found that, though "judicial review
of arbitration is.. .limited,... it is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with
the requirements of the statute."67
After the Gilmer decision, most courts developed a distinct line between re-
quired arbitration of federal statutory claims under an individual employment
contract and a CBA. Courts applied Gilmer to private employment contracts, but
continued to apply Gardner-Denver in cases involving a CBA. Judge Posner
stated in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co. that "[t]he conservative reading of Gilmer
is that it just pruned some dicta from [Gardner-Denver]-and it certainly cannot
be taken to hold that collective bargaining agreements can compel the arbitration
of statutory rights." 69 There are two main reasons why courts have continued to
apply Gardner-Denver to CBA cases.70 First, courts believe that to waive one's
right to judicial forum for such claims, one must individually agree to this provi-
sion.' Second, the courts are concerned that because the union has exclusive
control over the arbitration process, the union could deny the individual vindica-
tion of his or her statutory rights.72
However, after the Gilmer decision, the Fourth Circuit extended Gilmer's
holding to arbitration of federal statutory claims under CBAs in Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc.73 In that case, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
the "union has the right and duty to bargain for the terms and conditions of em-
ployment" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the "right to
arbitrate is a term or condition of employment." 74 Therefore, the union had the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 29.
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id.at 30.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32 & n.4.
68. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001) (holding that Gilmer dic-
tates that an arbitration agreement in a private employment contract is enforceable in regard to federal
statutory claims); but see Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 749-52 (1981)
(holding that Gardner-Denver dictates that individual federal statutory rights cannot be required to be
arbitrated under a collective bargaining agreement).
69. 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997).
70. Paul Salvatore & John F. Fullerton, III, Arbitration of Discrimination Claims in the Union Set-




73. 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 885.
[Vol. 2010520
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right and duty to bargain for this right. The court acknowledged that because
this case arose out of a CBA, "there may be concern for any tension between col-
lective representation and statutory rights."7 The court disposed of this concern
by stating that Austin was a "party to a voluntary agreement" in which she specif-
ically "agreed to the arbitration of her statutory complaints" and the court further
relied on the "federal labor law policy encouraging arbitration of labor disputes as
expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy."77
The Supreme Court did not initially embrace the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Owens-Brockway Glass. The Court reigned in the Fourth Circuit's application of
Gilmer's decision to collective bargaining agreements by suggesting in Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., that when a cause of action arises, not out of
the collective bargaining agreement, but rather out of the meaning and application
of a federal civil rights statute, a decision by an arbitrator may not be appropri-
ate.78 The Court held that a waiver of judicial forum for employees' statutory
rights must be "explicitly stated" in the agreement to be enforceable. The Court
addressed the highly contentious provision of the ADA, which stated that the use
of dispute resolution methods, including arbitration, is encouraged in resolving
disputes under the relevant section.7 9 The Court concluded that this provision
meant that when there had been a "waiver of employee rights to a federal judicial
forum" that is "clear and unmistakable," it may be appropriate to submit such a
claim to arbitration.8 0 If there had been no such waiver, then it would be inappro-
priate to compel arbitration.8 1 The Wright Court found that there was no such
"clear and unmistakable" waiver in the collective bargaining agreement at issue in
the case, and did not reach the question of whether such a waiver would be enfor-
ceable.
The Supreme Court finally reached the question of whether such a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver was enforceable in Pyett.83 In the wake of Wright, Second
Circuit precedent had evolved into the principle that "even a clear and unmistaka-
ble union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory
claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable."" The Court granted certiorari to
answer this question, left unresolved by Wright. The majority reasoned that the
rights provided by the ADEA could not be waived in any instance, but submitting
these claims to arbitration did not constitute a waiver of those rights." The Court
did not explicitly overrule Gardner-Denver or Gilmer, but instead distinguished
75. Id.
76. Id. at 883 n.2.
77. Id; see e.g., (Steelworker's Trilogy) United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg., Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
78. 525 U.S. 70, 78-82 (1998).
79. Id. at 82 n.2.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 82.
83. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (2009).
84. See 498 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 552 U.S. 1178
(2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (5-4 decision) (2009); see also Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73
(2d Cir. 2000).
85. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469-70.
No. 2] 521
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the two cases.86 Gardner-Denver and its progeny, Justice Thomas explained,
were limited to instances in which the "agreement did not cover [federal] statutory
claims."87 In the Gardner-Denver line of cases, the agreements at issue simply
did not cover statutory claims.88 The Court concluded that this line of cases had
nothing to do with the arbitrability of federal statutory claims, but they were in-
stead decided on the scope of the contract.89 Therefore, Gardner-Denver shed no
light on the issue of whether an arbitration agreement that expressly covered fed-
eral statutory claims would be enforceable."0 The Court, in limiting Gardner-
Denver to its facts, recognized that Gardner-Denver was not decided solely on its
facts.9 ' The Pyett Court dismissed the rest of the Gardner-Denver Court's con-
cerns as "mistrust of the arbitral process." 92 The Court stated "[t]hese misconcep-
tions have been corrected .. . [and] there is no reason to assume at the outset that
arbitrators will not follow the law."93 The Court held "that a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate
ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law."94 However, the Court
refused to answer the question "of whether [a] CBA allows [a u]nion to prevent
[employees] from effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the arbi-
tral forum."95  Instead, the Court reserved this question for a later date because
any decision in that case would have been speculative. Justice Souter surmised
in his dissent that "the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly
reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable
when the union controls access to and presentation of employees' claims in arbi-
tration ... which is usually the case ....
Clearly, Justice Souter's speculation that the majority opinion would have lit-
tle effect was incorrect, as lower courts have not been hesitant to apply Pyett's
holding to union-negotiated CBAs. However, lower courts have been left with the
challenge of determining the applicability of its holding. Many early decisions
citing Pyett held that the "clear and unmistakable" standard is synonymous with
an "express" waiver. In Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.,98
neither the contract nor the arbitration clause at issue made any mention of "em-
86. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 passim.
87. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1467 (2009) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting);
see Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981) (reasoning that "[a]n arbitra-
tor's power is both derived from, and limited by, the collective-bargaining agreement . . . so as to
effectuate the collective intent of the parties."); See also McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466
U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984) (stating that "because an arbitrator's authority derives solely from the con-
tract, an arbitrator may not have the authority to enforce" a federal, statutory claim when that provision
is left unaddressed by the arbitration agreement (citation omitted)).
88. Pyeti, 129 S. Ct. at 1467.
89. Id. at 1468.
90. Id. at 1469.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1469-70.
93. Id.
94. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1471.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1480 (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. 910 N.E.2d 317, 326-27 (Mass. 2009).
522 [Vol. 2010
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ployment discrimination statutes or claims."99 The district court held that because
of the absence of "reference to employment discrimination statutes or claims," the
"terms of the agreement were insufficiently clear" to compel federal statutory civil
rights claims.10
In Shipkevich v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. the collective bargaining agree-
ment at issue contained a nondiscrimination clause, which made no mention of
Title VII claims.10' The district court held that this nondiscrimination provision
did not satisfy Pyett's "clear and unmistakable" waiver standard, and, therefore,
the employee was not required to arbitrate his Title VII claims.' 02 The nondiscri-
mination clause in the collective bargaining agreement at issue in Markell v. Kais-
er Foundation Health Plan of Northwest went one step further than Shipkevich,
stating that the employer and union will each "fully comply with applicable laws
and regulations regarding discrimination."' 03  The district court found that this
reference to "applicable laws and regulations" was insufficient to satisfy the "clear
and unmistakable" standard to require the arbitration of statutory claims.'0 The
court went on to assert that where an arbitration agreement authorized only con-
tract-based claims (as opposed to statutory claims) "the preclusive effect of an
arbitral decision on subsequent federal litigation of statutory claims remains go-
verned by Gardner-Denver and its progeny." 0 5
The collective bargaining agreement at issue in Catrino v. Ocean City con-
tained a nondiscrimination clause similar to the ones in Shipkevich and Markell,
with one important distinction. Catrino's arbitration clause expressly referenced
99. Id. at 321. The arbitration agreement stated in relevant part:
Any claim, controversy or dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or
its negotiations shall be settled by arbitration. Each party hereto shall designate an inde-
pendent arbitrator and these two arbitrators shall select a third independent arbitrator
who shall be chairperson of the panel. The arbitrators shall then conduct the arbitration at
a mutually acceptable site and a majority shall render a decision as to the matter in dis-
pute, which decision shall be binding on the parties hereto. Each party shall bear the ex-
pense of its own arbitrator and an equal share of the expense of the third arbitrator. To
the extent not otherwise hereinabove provided, the arbitration shall be conducted in ac-
cordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. The full rules of discovery shall apply to any such proceeding.
Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 328.
101. No. 08-CV-1008 (FB)(JMA), 2009 WL 1706590, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) (mem.). The
nondiscrimination provision stated in relevant part: "Neither the Employer nor the Union shall discri-
minate against or in favor of any Employee on account of race, color, creed, national origin, political
belief, sex, sexual orientation, citizenship status, marital status, disability or age." Id
102. Id. at *2.
103. No. CV 08-752-PK, 2009 WL 3334897, *2 (D. Or. Oct. 15, 2009). The nondiscrimination
clause stated in relevant part:
The Employer and the Union agree that each will fully comply with applicable laws and
regulations regarding discrimination and will not discriminate against any Employee be-
cause of such person's race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, age, marital
status, physical or mental handicap, veteran status, sexual orientation, or the membership
in and/or activity on behalf of the Union.
Id.
104. Id. at *7.
105. Id. at *7; see also Jones v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., Civil No. 09-10525-RGS, 2009 WL
3488079, *2 (Oct. 23, 2009) (finding that the arbitration clause was contractual, and not statutory, and,
therefore, controlled by Gardner-Denver, not Pyett).
523No. 2]1
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the ADA, but only to define the term "disability" in the agreement.106 The district
court held that, though the discrimination clause was "premised on the same un-
derlying facts" of the ADA claim, the employee had not "waived his right to pur-
sue [that claim] in federal court because the CBA did not express or imply that
[the] claims based on federal statutes must be arbitrated."'0 7
Cases that have found a "clear and unmistakable" waiver have tended to
closely mirror the arbitration agreement at issue in Pyett. In Jorge-Colon v. Man-
dra Spa Puerto Rico, Inc. the nondiscrimination clause provided that arbitration
was the "required and exclusive forum" for disputes "arising under Title VII." 08
The district court compelled arbitration because the clause "expressly provid[ed]
for arbitration of Title VII claims."'" Similarly, both Johnson v. Tishman Speyer
Properties, L.P."10 and Borrero v. Ruppert Housing Co.' held that agreements
that expressly provided for arbitration of Title VII claims satisfied the "clear and
unmistakable" standard in Pyett.ll2 It appears that courts are showing little resis-
tance to Pyett when the arbitration agreement is substantially similar in substance
to the arbitration clause at issue in Pyett. Kravar is the first case since the Pyett
decision to take on the Supreme Court's unanswered question as to whether a
union refusal to arbitrate an employee's federal statutory claim would invalidate
an arbitration agreement.
106. Civ. A. No. WMN-09-505, 2009 WL 2151205, at *3 (D. Md. July 14, 2009) (mem.), vacated on
other grounds by, Civ. A. No. WMN-09-505, 2009 WL 3347356 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2009) (mem.). The
nondiscrimination provision stated in relevant part:
The provisions of this Agreement shall be applied equally to all employees in the bar-
gaining unit for which the FOP is the certified representative without discrimination as to
age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, political affiliation, disability
as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or sexual orientation.
Id.
107. Id. at *4.
108. 685 F.Supp.2d 280, 284-85 (D. P.R. Feb. 18, 2010).The arbitration clause stated in relevant part:
The required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all disputes relating to and arising
out of [the employees'] employment or the termination of employment (and which are
not resolved by the internal dispute resolution procedure), including but not limited to
claims, demands or actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and any
other federal, state or local statute, regulation or common law doctrine, regarding em-
ployment discrimination, conditions of employment, compensation, benefits or termina-
tion of employment.
Id.
109. Id. at 287 n.8.
I10. No. 09 Civ. 1959 (WIP), 2009 WL 3364038, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (mem.).
111. No. 08 CV 5869 (HB), 2009 WL 1748060, *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009).
112. Johnson, No. 09 Civ. 1959 (WHP), 2009 WL 3364038 at *2-*3. "The CBA provides that em-
ployment discrimination claims made pursuant to, inter alia, Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the
NYCHRL "shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure ... as the sole and exclusive
remedy for violations." Id. at *2; Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co., 2009 WL 1706590 at * I. The CBA
provided that "discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color,
age, disability, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, union membership, or any characteristic pro-
tected by law, including but not limited to claims made pursuant to Title VII ... [and] the Americans
with Disabilities Act." CBA at fI XVII.23. The CBA further provides that "all such claims shall be
subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure ( [set forth in] Articles V and VI) as sole and exclu-
sive remedy for violations. Id.
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2010, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2010/iss2/11
Union Refusal to Arbitrate
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Trian-
gle's first motion to compel arbitration on September 17, 2007.113 In that case, the
court relied on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,ll4 and the Second Circuit precedent
of Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co." 5 and Rogers v. N.Y. U."6 , holding unenfor-
ceable a union-negotiated CBA, which mandated arbitration of Kravar's claims of
discrimination under Title VII and the ADA." 7 When 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett was
handed down, Triangle moved to compel arbitration a second time in light of the
new precedent." 8 Pyett held that a "collective-bargaining agreement that clearly
and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [statutory claims] is enfor-
ceable as a matter of federal law."ll 9 The court found that the arbitration clause at
issue in Pyett was "identical in all material respects" to the one at issue in Kra-
var.120
The court then considered the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to decline to
consider "whether the CBA operates as a substantive waiver of the plaintiffs
[statutory rights] because it not only precludes a federal lawsuit, but also allows
the Union to block arbitration of these claims."' 2' In light of this unresolved is-
sue, the court found that "there was little question that if Kravar's union prevented
her from arbitrating her disability discrimination claims, the CBA's arbitration
provision may not be enforced as to her." 22 The court admitted that the current
record was sparse, considering the conflicting testimony of the union representa-
tive, the sworn statement of Kravar, and the less-than-complete grievance form.123
Nonetheless, the district court found that the sparse record only supported the
conclusion that the CBA in this case "operated to preclude Ms. Kravar from bring-
ing her disability discrimination claims in any forum." 24 As such, the court found
it "operated as a waiver over Ms. Kravar's substantive rights, and may not be
enforced." 25
Triangle argued that the fact that the union failed to arbitrate Kravar's claim
was irrelevant to it, because Triangle was always willing to arbitrate Kravar's
ADA claim.126 The court dismissed Triangle's argument as confusion of the issue
in that neither the union nor the employer's consent is more critical.127
113. Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., 509 F.Supp.2d 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
114. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36.
115. 498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 552 U.S. 1178 (2008),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (5-4 decision) (2009).
116. 220 F. 3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
117. Kravar, 509 F.Supp.2d at 409.
118. Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
19,2009) (mem).
119. Id.




124. Kravar, 2009 WL 1392595 at *3
125 Id.
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V. COMMENT
Pyett resolved Wright's open question as to whether a union can waive its
employees' right to a judicial forum for federal statutory claims. The Court found
that as long as the arbitration agreement in a CBA contains a "clear and unmistak-
able" waiver of the right to a judicial forum for the statutory right at issue, the
employer may compel arbitration from the employee.'28 However, Pyett left open
a far more difficult question and provided only speculative guidance: What effect
does a union's refusal to arbitrate an employee's federal statutory grievance under
a CBA have on the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself? Kravar clearly
illustrates the struggle courts face in attempting to balance the tension of individu-
al employees' interests with union interests regarding the arbitration of federal
statutory rights. The fact that Kravar was decided only forty-nine days after the
Pyett decision indicates that this question is not one made for speculative argu-
ment, but rather one that will have real and substantial implications in the labor
arbitration landscape. Commentators and courts have been quick to attempt to
answer Pyett's open question with the greatest fairness to all parties.
A. Duty ofFair Representation
Although Pyett did not establish how courts should handle a union's refusal
to arbitrate an individual employee's statutory claim, it did provide a reason why
this was not a compelling concern in its ultimate decision. The reason put forth by
the Court was that the union was obligated to operate under the "duty of fair re-
presentation."l 29 The Court reasoned that because the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) had been interpreted to impose such a duty on the union, and that
"given this avenue that Congress has made available to redress a union's violation
of its duty to its members, it is particularly inappropriate to ask this Court to im-
pose an artificial limitation on the collective-bargaining process." 30 The Court,
however, did not reach the question of whether the CBA allows a union to prevent
employees from effectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum.' 3 1 The Court left that question for another day, because that was not at
issue in the case.' 32
The Court's suggestion, that the duty of fair representation will sufficiently
protect an employee with a meritorious claim that the union has declined to pur-
sue, is tenuous at best. To sustain a claim for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion, an employee must satisfy a two pronged test. The employee must first show
a breach of contract by the employer-that his original claim was meritorious.
Second, the employee must show that the union conduct is "arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith.' 33 Within the second prong, the questions of whether the
128. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (5-4 decision) (2009).
129. Id. at 1463.
130. Id. at 1473.
131. Id. at 1474.
132. Id.
133. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Duty ofFair Representation Jurisprudential Reform: The Need to Adju-
dicate Disputes in Internal Union Review Tribunals and the Forgotten Remedy of Re-Arbitration, 42
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 517, 525 (2009) (citing Vaca v. Snipes 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); see also
526 [Vol. 2010
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union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith must each be analyzed
separately.134 Not only does this test impose an extraordinary burden on the em-
ployee, it offers no protection to an employee when that employee has a merito-
rious claim, but the union has denied the claim without breaching its duty of fair
representation. Because the test is two pronged, an employee with an entirely
meritorious claim could be denied arbitration based on union concerns that have
no relation to the merit of the employee's claim and yet, because the union is not
doing so arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, the union will not be liable
for breach of the duty of fair representation.'3 5 This would leave the employee
without a forum in which he or she may vindicate his or her federal statutory
rights.
There are many reasons that a union might reject an employee's meritorious
grievance and still not breach its duty of fair representation.136 "A union does not
have to process a grievance that it deems lacks merit, as long as it makes that de-
termination in good faith." 3 7 The union may independently decide that an em-
ployee's claim lacks merit, and even if that determination is negligently in error,
dismissal of the grievance would not be a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion,.'3 8 So if the union did not act in bad faith, arbitrarily, or in a discriminatory
manner, the employee, with an otherwise meritorious claim, is left with no remedy
in either the arbitral forum or the judicial forum. Even if the employee could
prove that the union did breach its duty of fair dealing, the grieved employee's
action lies against the union, not against the employer, the original alleged wrong-
doer. The employee may have many reasons for wishing not to pursue an action
against his own union. He or she may be concerned about retaliation from the
union, or may have a loyalty toward the collective group, and not wish to bring
such an action. The employee may also want to vindicate his rights against the
employer who wronged him, not the union, of which he is still a member.
The facts of Kravar illustrate the difficulties of applying a rule that relies on
the duty of fair dealing. If the Kravar court relied on this duty of fair dealing to
protect Kravar's rights, the court would have no choice but to compel arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement, to which the union would presumably
have responded by refusing to allow her to arbitrate her claim in the grievance
process, as it had done previously. Kravar would be left only with an action for
breach of the duty of fair dealing against her union. She would then, in a new
action, have to prove not only that her claim was meritorious, but additionally that
the union acted in "bad faith," "arbitrarily," or "discriminatorily." This extra pro-
Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 878, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff em-
ployee bears the burden of proving both a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union, and a
breach of contract by the employer).
134. Rubenstein, supra note 133, at 528-29. "Under Vaca, a union's actions are considered arbitrary if
they are so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be considered irrational." Id. "A showing
of bad faith requires establishing fraudulent, deceitful or dishonest action." Id. "To establish discrimi-
nation, a plaintiff must show animus on behalf of the union and that the plaintiff was treated differently
than others." Id.
135. Id. at 529.
136. "The duty of fair representation does not require that a union fully pursue every grievance filed."
Driver v. U.S. Postal Serv., Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir. 2003).
137. Id.




Van Pelt: Van Pelt: Union Refusal to Arbitrate
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cedural hoop and additional substantive burden seems ludicrous when considered
with the fact that the "primary goal of arbitration . . . is to provide the efficient,
economical and expeditious resolution of private disputes."' 3
The extra substantive hoop of proving the union acted arbitrarily, discrimina-
torily, or in bad faith would result in greater litigation costs as well. The facts of
Kravar demonstrate how difficult the inquiry into whether the union acted arbitra-
rily, in bad faith, or discriminatorily can be. Kravar contended that her union
declined to prosecute her claims for disability discrimination, and that her union
representative laughed when she told him that she wanted to arbitrate her claim.140
She also stated that the union representative told her that she could not do so be-
cause the union would most likely dismiss her complaint.141 Although a repre-
sentative laughing at an employee is not the hallmark of cordiality, is it a showing
of bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the union? And furthermore, does the
fact that a union representative denied a claim on the belief that the union would
dismiss the claim establish any one of the elements of the second prong of the
breach of the duty of fair dealing by the union? Persuasive arguments can be
made both in favor of the union and employee, and resolving those arguments
would add a substantial and costly extra hurdle to vindication of federal statutory
rights, making the duty of fair dealing nearly worthless in protecting an employee
who has been denied the opportunity to arbitrate a meritorious claim by his or her
umon.
B. Individual Right to Demand Arbitration
Commentators have also suggested that an individual right to demand arbitra-
tion and exercise control over appropriate issues would adequately protect an
employee's federal statutory rights against union refusal to arbitrate.142 Under this
theory, the employee would have a right to arbitration of his or her claim upon
demand under the CBA.143 The legitimacy of this solution is threatened by the
question of who would bear the expense of arbitration. If courts require unions to
bear the costs of the grievant's insisted-upon arbitration, the union would be
stripped of its discretionary power to reject frivolous claims.'" The employee
would have an unfettered incentive to bring his claim, because he would have
nothing to lose but the union's resources. Union discretion in determining which
grievances to arbitrate is essential to the functioning of the collective bargaining
system.145 If the union were stripped of its discretionary spending power as a
139. City of Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., 899 A.2d 523, 535 (Conn. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
140. Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
19, 2009) (mem).
141. Id.
142. Mark Berger, A Step Too Far: Pyett and the Compelled Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under
Union-Controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 88-89 (2009).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 89.
145. See Vaca v. Snipes 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) ("If the individual employee could compel arbitra-
tion of his grievance regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would
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prerequisite to bargaining for arbitration of all its member's federal statutory
claims, it would be unlikely that any union would enter into such an agreement.
One solution offered by Professor Mark Berger is to make the grievant re-
sponsible for his or her own representation costs, while the employer foots the bill
for the cost of the arbitral proceeding (e.g., arbitrator's fee).146 In such an agree-
ment, the employer would be required to pay for arbitration proceedings, and the
employee's claim would not be subject to any form of union discretion. Because
the claim would not be subject to discretion, the employee would be entitled to a
full hearing and decision on the employer's dime without any of discretionary
safeguards that currently exist in both grievance arbitration processes and judicial
proceedings. It is hard to see why any employer would bargain for such a me-
chanism over the court system, which at least has the power to efficiently dismiss
frivolous claims.
It is also nearly impossible to see any benefit to the claimant under such an
agreement.147 The employee would retain none of the benefits of CBA grievance
procedures when arbitrating federal statutory rights. The employee "would be in
the same situation as many individual complainants in non-union arbitrations," but
at least those non-union complainants bargained personally for their arbitration
agreement.148 It is not logical that the union be able to bargain away employees'
rights to a judicial forum when the union will not be the one responsible for the
costs of arbitration representation. The union would bear no responsibility to the
grievant in this situation, and therefore, it is not its right to bargain.
Because the employer is unlikely to enter into an agreement that makes it sub-
ject to unlimited nondiscretionary arbitration costs, and because the union has no
logical authority to bargain away its member's rights without subsequent union
support, allowing an individual right to demand arbitration is not an adequate or
feasible protection for an individual grievant.
C Kravar's Approach: Nonenforceability ofArbitration Provision in the
Face of Union Refusal to Arbitrate
Justice Souter's dissent in Pyett suggested, "[T]he majority opinion may have
little effect, for it explicitly reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of judi-
cial forum is enforceable when the union controls access to and presentation of
employee's claims in arbitration . . .which is usually the case."' 49 It is clear that
lower courts generally have not been hesitant to apply Pyett's "clear and unmis-
takable" waiver to allow employers to compel arbitration under a CBA as long as
the language closely tracks the language in the arbitration clause in Pyett. s0 To
146. Berger, supra note 142, at 90-91.
147. Berger argues that benefit to the claimant would be that the employee has greater access to the
arbitral proceeding, rather than a judicial forum because of cost savings. Id at 89-90. However, this
logic does not provide a reason for why the employee benefits from allowing the union to bargain its
member's right to a judicial forum without subsequent union support.
148. Id. at 91.
149. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1480 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150._Jorge-Colon v. Mandara Spa P.R., Inc., 685 F.Supp.2d at 284-85 (D. P.R. 2010); Johnson v.
Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1959 (WHP), 2009 WL 3364038, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,
No. 2] 529
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that immediate extent, Justice Souter's proposition that Pyett's decision will have
little effect has been incorrect. However, early cases such as Kravar suggest that
his proposition may carry more weight as Pyett's progeny develops.
In Kravar, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
fashioned a rule stating that, in the face of union refusal to arbitrate a grievant's
claims, the arbitration agreement is not enforceable against that grievant.' 5' The
court stated the rule in absolutes, requiring no showing by the employee of a
breach of duty of fair dealing, or any showing of the merits of the underlying
claim. Instead, Kravar established an absolute right to a judicial forum in the face
of union refusal to arbitrate federal statutory claims covered by a CBA's arbitra-
tion agreement. Although this is not exactly what Justice Souter stated in his
Pyett dissent, it bears his sentiment insofar as it invalidates agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims when the access to the grievance process is union controlled.
Kravar adds the additional requirement for invalidation that the union exercise
that control to deny that employee an arbitral forum.
The court in Kravar did not offer a detailed, logical explanation of its reason-
ing for invalidating the CBA's arbitration agreement as applied to Kravar. In-
stead, it simply stated "[tihe current record is sparse, but it only supports a single
conclusion: The CBA here operated to preclude Ms. Kravar from raising her disa-
bility-discrimination claims in any forum. As such, the CBA operated as a waiver
over Ms. Kravar's substantive rights, and may not be enforced."' 52 This conten-
tion may be subject to scrutiny in that it sounds similar to Gardner-Denver, find-
ing that the grievance procedure acted as a waiver of the employee's substantive
rights. 5 3  Gilmer and Pyett expressly dispelled those "arbitral mistrusts".1 54
Those criticisms aside, the rule has logical foundations and sound policy results.
The Kravar rule sufficiently protects employees' interests, which may be in
conflict with collective union interests. Under Kravar, if an employee's union
denies his or her grievance, that employee, as a matter of right, has a cause of
action in federal district court. Though the employee will not have the benefit of
the union bearing the costs of representation, the employee will be in the same
position as he or she would have been had the union not bargained away his or her
right to a judicial forum for federal statutory rights in favor of an arbitral forum.
The employee will also be able to retain the collective benefits of the union and
employer's selection of the arbitral forum to settle disputes when the union does
not deny the employee's grievance. When an employee's grievance is denied by
his or her union, the employee will not be required to show some wrongdoing on
the union's part to have his or her claim heard, as he or she would have to show to
prove in an action for breach of duty of fair dealing. The Kravar rule would im-
pose no extra burden on the employee, and would ensure he or she has a forum for
vindication of his or her statutory rights. Furthermore, if an employee truly
2009) (mem.); Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co., No. 08 CV 5869 (HB), 2009 WL 1748060, *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 19, 2009).
151. Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 WL 1392595, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
19, 2009) (mem).
152. Id.
153. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
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wished to arbitrate his or her federal statutory claim under the collective bargain-
ing agreement instead of bringing the action in a court, he or she could still choose
to pursue a cause of action against the union under the duty of fair representation.
The Kravar rule also sufficiently protects union interests. The union would
not lose its discretion subject to an employee's demand to arbitrate, as it would if
an individual had the right to demand arbitration under the CBA. The union's
ability to filter frivolous claims from worthwhile claims is an important union
function. 1ss This rule would allow the union to continue to exercise discretion,
while retaining the collective benefits of arbitrating individual federal statutory
discriminatory claims.
Finally, the Kravar rule seems to impose the greatest burden on the employer.
The employer's incentive to require arbitration of statutory claims is undoubtedly
litigation cost savings. This incentive would be seriously undermined by a rule
that allowed an employee to circumvent the arbitration agreement based on union
refusal to arbitrate (over which the employer has no control). However, employer
incentive to require arbitration is adequately preserved by two counterbalancing
considerations. First, the employee will be required to bear the costs of his own
litigation. Because the union rejected his grievance, the employee will be discou-
raged, not prevented, from bringing a frivolous claim, leaving only those claims
with merit remaining. Of course, this will not discourage all frivolous suits, but
the few that remain will be easily disposed of with the second counterbalancing
consideration-summary judgment.' 5 6 If an employee's claim is truly frivolous,
summary judgment will dispose of his claim with relative efficiency. Still, even
with those two counterbalancing considerations, there will be claims in the judi-
cial forum that will survive summary judgment motions. Claims that survive
summary judgment motions do so because there remains a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact, and those claims are precisely the ones that should be protected.'57 If
there remains a genuine issue of material fact, then an employee should be entitled
to have his case heard. If the union and the employer have prevented the em-
ployee from obtaining such a hearing by agreeing to arbitrate federal statutory
claims, then the employee should, as a matter of right, be entitled to have his
claim heard in federal court.
Since the Kravar decision, the Southern District of New York has cited its
own rule twice with approval, though in those cases it was not directly applica-
ble.'5 In Borrero v. Ruppert Housing Co., Inc. the court indicated the pervasive-
ness of its newly fashioned rule as it compelled plaintiffs arbitration of statutory
claims under Pyett, but dismissed the case without prejudice because the em-
ployee had not yet filed a grievance with the union. The court suggested that it
dismissed the case without prejudice because if the employee's grievance were to
155. Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) ("If the individual employee could compel arbitration
of his grievance regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would be
substantially undermined . . . .").
156 See Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: "Creeping Legalism" as a Declension Myth, 2010 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 16 (2010) ("Even when employees file suit, federal courts have been surprisingly willing to
dismiss their claims on summary judgment").
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
158. Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co.,.No. 08 CV 5869 (HB), 2009 WL 1748060, *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
2009); Johnson v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1959 (WHP), 2009 WL 3364038, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (mem.).
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be denied by the union, his action would be proper in the federal district court.
The Southern District of New York has further developed the rule only to apply
after an employee has pursued a grievance of the specific statutory clams, and the
union has denied arbitration of those statutory claims.160 It is also notable that if
the Kravar rule is appealed from the Southern District of New York, it will be
heard in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the Second Circuit's hostility
to Wright that led to the decision in Pyett. Whether the decision in Kravar is
simply remaining hostility towards Wright or an attempt to answer the difficult
question left open by Pyett is yet to be determined, as Pyett's progeny has only
begun to take shape.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kravar's solution is by no means perfect. However, it is currently the best
answer offered to Pyett's open question: What happens when the union refuses to
arbitrate an employee's claim under a collective bargaining agreement? It pro-
tects employee interests by ensuring them a forum for vindication of their federal,
statutory rights. It protects union interests by preserving union discretion in the
grievance process, and it does so without shouldering the union with any extra
costs. It protects the employer's interests because it allows them to require arbi-
tration of statutory claims brought by the union, and efficiently dispose of frivol-
ous claims through summary judgment. The only claims left in federal court will
be the meritorious claims that have fallen through the cracks of the grievance
procedure. Those claims should not be sacrificed for any federal policy favoring
arbitration.
F. RYAN VAN PELT
159. Borrero, 2009 WL 1748060, at *2.
160. Johnson, 2009 WL 364038, at *4. In Johnson, the plaintiff was suspended for violating building
safety requirements. He was covered by a CBA containing a clear and unmistakable requirement to
arbitrate federal statutory claims. The plaintiff filed a grievance with said union claiming unjust sus-
pension, but the plaintiff asserted no claims of discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs union held
the grievance in abeyance to determine whether or not it should be pursued, and plaintiff failed to
comply with procedure, so the grievance was dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed an
action in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York claiming discrimination by
his supervisors and hostility from union representatives regarding his grievance. Id. at *2.
532 [Vol. 2010
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